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CRIMINAL LAW
I. MENTAL COMPETENCY OF THE DEFENDANT
In State v. Cannon,' the defendant was convicted of murder
after basing his defense on criminal insanity. Defense counsel
had requested that the trial judge charge the jury on the "federal
rule' 2 of insanity as a defense, but the charge given was essen-
tially the one that South Carolina courts have employed since
1886 3-the M'Naghten rule.4 Cannon excepted to the charge,
claiming denial of his rights to due process and equal protection
under the United States Constitution. The South Carolina Su-
preme Court, however, affirmed his conviction, stating that:
We are aware of the alternatives which some courts have
adopted, but are not convinced that the other rules set forth a
better formula for determining whether a person accused of
crime should be excused because of his mental condition. It
should be comforting to those who would attack the M'Naghten
Rule to realize that a layman jury, regardless of the rule re-
cited, normally takes a common sense approach and determines
whether the accused person is, first, guilty or not guilty, and if
guilty, whether his mental condition is such that he ought to be
1. 260 S.C. 537, 197 S.E.2d 678 (1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 334 (U.S. Nov. 20,
1973).
2. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
§4.01. Mental Disease or Defect Excluding Responsibility.
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity
either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform
his conduct to the requirements of law.
(2) As used in this Article, the terms "mental disease or defect" do not
include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-
social conduct.
3. State v. Bundy, 24 S.C. 439, 58 Am. Rep. 262 (1886); See also State v. Thorne,
239 S.C. 164, 121 S.E.2d 623 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 979 (1962); State v. Allen, 231
S.C. 391, 98 S.E.2d 826 (1957).
4. M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718. The jury was instructed that
it was to decide whether at the time of the crime the defendant "had or had not the use
of his understanding, so as to know that he was doing a wrong or wicked act" and was to
be found guilty if he was "in a sound state of mind." The majority of the justices stated,
"[To establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at
the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect
of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he
was doing, or if he did know it that he did not know he was doing what was wrong." 8
Eng. Rep. at 722. See also Wingo, Squaring M'Naghten With Precedent-An Historical
Note, 26 S.C.L. REv. 81 (1973).
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excused of the crime because of his mental condition. We adhere
to the M'Naghten Rule.
The M'Naghten test of responsibility is recognized in the
overwhelming majority of American jurisdictions, though it is
supplemented in many areas by the so called "irresistible im-
pulse" test. Both standards, however, have drawn voluminous
criticism from judges and commentators alike.'
The M'Naghten test is generally condemned on two grounds.
First, critics argue that insanity alters the entire personality of
the patient rather than merely the cognitive faculties whose ab-
sence courts have deemed critical in applying M'Naghten's re-
quirement that the defendant "know" the difference between
right and wrong.8 Second, the critics contend that this misconcep-
tion in the M'Naghten test makes it inconsistent with the pur-
poses of criminal justice because it fails to exclude from punish-
ment many cases of advanced mental disorder that are not appro-
priate for the application of criminal sanctions.' The M'Naghten
test considers impairment of cognition and does not deal with
impairment of volitional capacity, but modern psychiatry seems
to demand that the two be considered equally. This problem
could be avoided in South Carolina by the adoption of the so
called "federal rule," first promulgated in 1962 by the American
Law Institute's Model Penal Code.'0 While M'Naghten requires
a complete impairment of capacity wherein the defendant must
not "know" the difference between right and wrong, the ALI test
requires only a substantial impairment of capacity." Thus the
5. 260 S.C. at 547-48, 197 S.E.2d at 682.
6. One authority has defined the irresistible impulse test as follows:
Broadly stated, this [test] requires a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity
if it is found that the defendant had a mental disease which prevented him from
controlling his conduct [at the time the crime was committed]. Such a verdict
is required even if the defendant knew what he was doing and that it was wrong,
the M'Naghten test and the "irresistible impulse" test are alternative-i.e. the
defendant's mental condition need not satisfy both the M'Naghten and "irre-
sistible impulse" tests. W. IAFAvE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW at 283 (1972).
7. See, e.g., A. GOLDSTEIN, M'Naghten, The Stereotype Challenged in CRIME, LAW
AND Socimv 387 (1971), reprinted from A. GOLDSTEIN, The Insanity Defense 45-66 (1967);
47 N.Y.U.L. REV. 962 (1972); See also ROYAL COMSSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1949-53
REPORT 80 (1953); but see Livermore & Meehl, The Virtues of M'Naghten, 51 MINN. L.
REV. 789, 800 (1967). See also Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954);
United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1961); United States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d
920 (4th Cir. 1968).
8. Diamond, From M'Naghten to Currens and Beyond, 50 CAL. L. REv. 189 (1962).
9. F. LINDMAN & D. MCINTYRE, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAw 337 (1961).
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ALI test would encompass those defendants with significantly
impaired cognitive or volitional capacity.
In writing the Model Penal Code, the draftsmen assumed
that a test of responsibility should give expression to an intelligi-
ble principle which they were unable to find in the M'Naghten
test. The requirement of "substantial capacity" in the ALI test
should harmonize legal principles and the underlying facts by
recognizing that there are certain persons with rudimentary
"knowledge" of right and wrong whose mental condition renders
them incapable of appreciating criminality in choosing a particu-
lar course of action. The legal test of insanity, therefore, must
focus on the causal relationship between the mental disorder and
the conduct of the accused. Thus, the "substantial capacity"
standard in the ALI test better corresponds to legal and psychiat-
ric realities than the M'Naghten rule. By requiring a degree of
capacity more realistically ascertainable by medical standards,
the ALI test should make it considerably easier to obtain effective
testimony from competent psychiatric experts. The inflexible
M'Naghten rule virtually assures the decision of cases in which
neither experts nor lay juries can actually ascertain beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the prescribed
degree of capacity at the time of the alleged act. Minimizing such
cases through application of the ALI test is a worthy goal for
practical as well as theoretical reasons. Indeed, as Professor Allen
has stated:
The truth is that probably most persons acquitted under
M'Naghten do possess some capacities, however limited, for
making moral evaluations of their behavior, despite the require-
ment of total incapacity. The danger is, if the test does not
adequately reflect the reality, caprice and inequities in its ad-
ministration will result. 2
The South Carolina Supreme Court seemingly agrees with
this statement. Implicit in its decision in Cannon is the supposi-
tion that juries actually apply a more flexible standard than that
charged under the M'Naghten rule-the court termed this a
"common sense approach."13 Since the court first recognized that
the jury does apply a standard less rigid than the one charged and
then tacitly approved of this practice, it seems logical that the
12. Allen, The Rule of the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, 45
MARQUEm L. Rv. 494, 500-01 (1962).
13. 260 S.C. at 548; 197 S.E.2d at 682.
1974]
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court too should adopt a test which embodies this more flexible
standard. The ALI "substantial capacity" test would satisfy
South Carolina's requirements and is already widely accepted
elsewhere. It has been adopted in every federal circuit except the
First, which has not considered the issue since 1962.11 In addition,
a number of states have adopted the ALI test either by judicial
decision 15 or by statute. 6
The ALI test is certainly not designed to effect dramatic
increases in exculpation in any jurisdiction. 7 Its adoption in
South Carolina would have minimal impact on verdicts which are
rendered under the "common sense approach" recognized in
Cannon. The court's observation there, however, is no guarantee
of the consistency in jury charges to which criminal defendants
are entitled. What is "common sense" for the jury is "common
sense" for the court as well, and the South Carolina Supreme
Court should hold that it is. The court should reconsider its
unquestioning adherence to the M'Naghten rule and adopt the
ALI test of mental capacity. By bringing the way juries are
charged into consonance with the way they allegedly act, the
court can help to provide both logic and consistency in the deter-
mination of mental capacity for future defendants in South Caro-
lina.
14. Beltran v. United States, 302 F.2d 48 (1st Cir. 1962). The Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia was the most recent court to adopt the ALI test. United States
v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The ALI test was adopted in the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1968).
In other circuits, see United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966); United States
v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961); Blake v. United States, 407 F.2d 908 (5th Cir.
1969); United States v. Smith, 404 F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1968); United States v. Shapiro, 383
F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1967); Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1967); Wade v.
United States, 426 F.2d 64 (9th Cir. 1970); Wion v. United States, 325 F.2d 420 (10th Cir.
1963).
15. Commonwealth v. McHoul, 352 Mass. 544, 226 N.E.2d 556 (1967); State v.
Shoffner, 31 Wis. 2d 412, 143 N.W.2d 458 (1966) (If the defendant so elects and assumes
the burden of proof under Wisconsin's criminal procedure); but see, e.g., Terry v. Com-
monwealth, 371 S.W.2d 862 (Ky. 1963); State v. Shantz, 98 Ariz. 200, 403 P.2d 521 (1965);
State v. White, 60 Wash. 2d 551, 374 P.2d 942 (1962); State v. Lucas, 30 N.J. 37, 152 A.2d
50 (1959).
16. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53 A-13 (1958); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 6-2 (1961);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 9(a) (1957); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 95-501 (1947); UTAH
CODE ANN. fit. 76, § 2-305 (1953).
17. Allen, supra note 12, at 501.
[Vol. 26
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The application of the common law "felony-murder rule""I
was challenged and upheld in two cases, Gore v. Leeke 9 and State
v. Holland.2 The co-defendants in Gore had broken into and
taken personal property from a residence. Their activities were
discovered and law officers were soon in pursuit of Gore's automo-
bile. During the chase a highway patrolman was fatally wounded
by co-defendant Phillips, who abandoned his friends to escape in
a commandeered vehicle.
Gore challenged the common law felony-murder rule as un-
constitutional in substance and in application to the facts of his
case. He argued that the presumption of malice in the rule vi-
tiates due process by permitting a murder conviction without
proof of malice beyond a reasonable doubt. The court rejected
this contention, noting that the presumption of malice is a rule
of law rather than a rule pertaining to burden of proof. In addi-
tion, "there is a rational connection between the fact proved and
the ultimate fact presumed or implied, to wit: malice from the
perpetration of a malum in se felony."
2'
It appears, however, that the court may choose to limit the
application of the rule in future decisions:
Under the facts of this case we are not called upon to decide
whether or not the felony murder rule should, or should not, be
applied as to every homicide committed in connection with the
commission of any and every felony whether or not inherently
or forseeably dangerous. . . . We conclude that the appellant's
conviction of murder under the felony-murder doctrine was fully
justified under the circumstances of this case.
2
18. In South Carolina, the rule is defined thus: "Whenever an unlawful act, an act
malum in se, is done in prosecution of a felonious intention, and death ensues, it will be
murder." Gore v. Leeke, 261 S.C. 308, 199 S.E.2d 755 (1973), quoting State v. Levelle, 34
S.C. 120, 13 S.E. 319 (1891).
19. 199 S.E.2d 755 (S.C. 1973). The court observed that although Gore's appeal in
this case was purportedly from an order denying post conviction relief, it was in substance
an appeal from the original conviction. A motion to file a belated appeal of the conviction
had previously been denied. Nevertheless, in view of the fundamental rights asserted and
certain facts not previously brought to the court's attention, the questions raised in the
present appeal were passed upon. The court did not indicate whether a second motion to
file a belated appeal would have been granted.
20. 201 S.E.2d 118 (S.C. 1973).
21. 199 S.E.2d at 758.
22. Id. at 759 (emphasis added in final sentence).
1974]
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Thus the court in Gore articulated a dual test which applies
the felony-murder rule both to felonies which are inherently dan-
gerous to human life and to felonies which are forseeably danger-
ous to human life merely because of the manner in which they are
committed. If properly administered, such a test seems to provide
the flexibility required to limit application of the felony-murder
rule to the types of cases in which both its deterrent and punitive
functions can be effective. But while the court in Gore indicated
that some felony homicides may not be felony murders under
either alternative of the dual test, the actions of the defendants
in Gore constituted felony murder under both alternatives:
Aside from any inherent danger in the breaking and entry of a
private residence, and larceny therefrom albeit in the daytime,
we have here the added fact that the crime was committed by
well-armed felons who were still in the course of escape and
asportation of the stolen goods immediately preceding the homi-
cide. 3
In Holland, the co-defendants had been convicted of murder
committed during the course of a robbery. On appeal, they ex-
cepted both to the denial of a directed verdict and to portions of
the trial court's charge to the jury. In rejecting the first conten-
tion, the court found that the evidence supported a conclusion
that murder was committed as a natural consequence of acts done
pursuant to an unlawful common design. Those participating in
that design would therefore be as guilty as the slayer.
The court disposed of the challenge to the jury instructions
essentially by rephrasing the reasoning encapsulated above. As
indicated in Justice Bussey's dissenting opinion, this approach
was less than responsive to the objections of the appellants, who
contended that the law as to other offenses and theories of crimi-
nal responsibility should have been included in the charge. 24
23. Id. see also State v. Thompson, 280 N.C. 202, 185 S.E.2d 666 (1972).
24. The evidence suggested that a defendant named Richards fatally stabbed the
victim after the robbery had been completed and in spite of urgings of his cohorts who
wished to leave the scene immediately. It follows that the jury could have found that the
murder was committed by Richards alone rather than in the course of (or as the forseeable
result of) a common felonious scheme. "Under the circumstances, the appellants were
entitled to a full and clear-cut instruction to the effect that if the State failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the homicide so occurred, the appellants should b6 acquit-
ted of homicide." 201 S.E.2d at 128 (Bussey, J., dissenting). In addition, evidence pre-
sented at trial indicated that some of the co-defendants may have participated in the
robbery under duress. Others voluntarily participated in binding and gagging the victim.
It is arguable that an adequate charge to the jury would necessarily have dealt with
[Vol. 26
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The court in Holland did not refer to the Gore opinion,
though Gore was decided only six weeks earlier, and actually
employed a different standard for determining the applicability
of the felony-murder rule. The test in Holland, which appeared
to focus solely on the manner in which the felony was committed,
was drawn from the opinion in State v. Crowe5 and was stated
thus:
[I]f two or more combine together to commit an unlawful act,
such as robbery, and, in the execution of the criminal act, a
homicide is committed by one of the actors, as a probable or
natural consequence of the acts done in pursuance of the com-
mon design, all present participating in the unlawful undertak-
ing are as guilty as the one who committed the unlawful act.28
The difference between the Gore and Holland standards for
felony murder is unfortunate and apparently without justifica-
tion. Since the Gore test was presented after a significant amount
of discussion, and the Holland court adopted the State v. Crowe
precedent without any explanation, it seems likely that the for-
mer decision may prevail; but, until the court clarifies its hold-
ings in Gore and Holland, the precise standard for determining
felony murder in South Carolina will not be clear.
B. Statutory Presumptions
The defendant in State v. Tabory27 challenged his conviction
of possession for sale of marijuana. His appeal asserted in part
that the statute under which he was convicted 8 created an uncon-
stitutional presumption that persons possessing more than five
grams of marijuana were prima facie guilty of possession for
manslaughter, assault and battery with intent to kill, assault and battery of a high and
aggravated nature, and the crime of accessory after the fact of murder. The majority,
however, concluded that "[t]he evidence admits of no other inference than that Thomas
Bolin was murdered and the sole issue before the jury was whether the appellants here
had participated in such a murder." Id. at 124.
25. 258 S.C. 258, 188 S.E.2d 379 (1972).
26. 201 S.E.2d at 125. See also State v. Cannon, 49 S.C. 550, 27 S.E. 526 (1897).
27. 260 S.C. 355, 196 S.E.2d 111 (1973).
28. S.C. CODE ANN., § 32-1492-1 (1970) amending S.C. COD ANN. § 32-1492 (1962).
This statute was superseded by S. C. CODE ANN. § 32-1510.21 et seq. (Supp. 1971).
29. Although the defendant was prosecuted under S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1492.1
(1970), the trial court instructed the jury as to the 28-gram presumption required by S.C.
CODE ANN. § 32-1510.49(b)(3) (Supp. 1971).
1974]
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sale. 9 The court cited language in Leary v. United States"' estab-
lishing the basic test for evaluating the constitutionality of crimi-
nal statutory presumptions:
[A] criminal statutory presumption must be regarded as "irra-
tional" or "arbitrary," and hence unconstitutional, unless it can
at least be said with substantial assurance that the presumed
fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which
it is made to depend.
3'
The South Carolina Supreme Court noted that the Court in Leary
also "recognized a strong presumption that statutes enacted by
the legislature are constitutional." 3 The defendant failed to sub-
stantiate his contention that there was no rationale between the
proven fact and the presumed fact and thus he failed to over-
come the presumption of constitutionality. The court observed
that the quantity of marijuana possessed was 2600 pounds and
concluded that had the presumption been erroneous such error
would have been inoffensive.
It is arguable that the Leary decision placed a burden on the
prosecution to demonstrate the rationality of challenged statu-
tory presumptions. In Tabory, however, the court seemed to sug-
gest that defendants are affirmatively required to "substantiate"
their arguments against such presumptions. The Leary opinion
itself is not a model of clarity, so the extent to which the Tabory
interpretation modifies it is open to question. It is apparent, how-
ever, that the issue of the constitutional ramifications of statutory
presumptions in South Carolina is not yet resolved.
III. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
The defendant in State v. Moultrie33 contended that incrimi-
nating evidence introduced at his trial had been obtained pur-
suant to an arrest made without probable cause. Police officers
had been patrolling a neighborhood in response to reports of a
30. 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
31. 260 S.C. at 363, 196 S.E.2d at 112; see 395 U.S. at 36. In Leary, the defendant
successfully challenged the statutory presumption in 21 U.S.C. § 176(a) that a person
possessing marijuana has knowingly and with fraudulent intent received illegally im-
ported marijuana.
32. Id. The language in Leary to which the court apparently referred is sdbject to
other interpretations. The Court there did say that, "in the judicial assessment the con-
gressional determination favoring the particular presumption must, of course, weigh heav-
ily." 395 U.S. at 35.
33. 261 S.C. 14, 198 S.E.2d 231 (1973).
(Vol. 26
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robbery-beating and other crimes possibly committed by the
same suspect, described as a tall Negro male wearing light co-
lored coveralls. Noting that the appellant fit this description, the
officers approached him and observed what appeared to be blood
stains on his clothes. He was arrested and a subsequent search
led to the discovery of objects taken in the robbery.
The court found that, in determining that probable cause
existed for the arrest, the trial judge properly considered evidence
as to the other crimes committed in the neighborhood. There was,
according to the court, sufficient evidence to fairly support the
determination of probable cause, and thus that finding was con-
clusive on appeal. 4 Given the legality of the arrest, evidence dis-
covered during the accompanying search of the defendant's per-
son was clearly admissible at trial. 5
In State v. Newman,36 the defendant argued that evidence
presented at his trial was the product of an unconstitutional
search and seizure and thus should have been suppressed. The
court rejected his contention that Miranda warnings are a prere-
quisite to effective consent to a search. It was established that the
defendant knew the officers who appeared at his door and freely
granted their request to search his premises for a small caliber
weapon. This uncontradicted testimony and the recent decision
of the United States Supreme Court in Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte37 supported the trial court's finding that consent to
the search was voluntarily given.
The defendant in State v. Tabory" asserted that contraband,
photographs and a search warrant 39should have been suppressed
at trial as the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure. The court
34. S.C. CONST. art. V, § 5 (Supp. 1973).
35. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). In this recent decision it was
decision it was held that, "[I]n the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the
person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment,
but is also a 'reasonable' search under the Amendment." Id. at -, 94 S. Ct. at 477.
36. 200 S.E.2d 82 (S.C. 1973).
37. 412 U.S. 218 (1973). In determining the voluntariness of consent to a warrantless
search, the Supreme Court applies a standard less stringent than the "intentional relin-
quishment of a known right or privilege" that must accompany the waiver of "trial rights."
Instead, "[Violuntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstan-
ces, and while the subject's knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken into
account, the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite
to establishing a voluntary consent." Id. at 248-249.
38. 260 S.C. 355, 196 S.E.2d 111 (1973).
39. It was the defendant's contention that the search warrant had been obtained after
an unlawful search uncovered the contraband.
1974]
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rejected his contention that the U-Haul truck in which he was a
passenger had been stopped and searched without probable
cause. Confronted by a recent series of robberies in the area in-
volving rental trucks, the sheriffs department had adopted a
policy of stopping and inspecting such vehicles at night. Upon
stopping the obviously loaded truck, a deputy was informed that
it was empty; thereafter, he walked to the rear of the vehicle and
smelled marijuana. A search warrant was obtained and the con-
traband discovered. The trial court's finding of probable cause
was supported by United States v. Gomori0 in which similar facts
were held to justify a warrantless search.
In State v. Jackson," the defendants contended that they
had been arrested without probable cause and that incriminating
objects subsequently seized were improperly admitted into evi-
dence. The supreme court found, however, that officers had "rea-
sonable cause" to forcibly stop the automobile in which defen-
dants were riding, that the incriminating evidence was found in
plain view, and that this discovery preceded the arrest.42 Regard-
ing the timing of the arrest, the court concluded that the
"[airgument that the arrest took place prior to discovery is
meaningless because there is no suggestion that the defendants
would have been retained in custody absent these indicia of crim-
inality."43
In Henry v. United States," the defendant's car had been
waved to a stop by federal agents who suspected that the defen-
dant had violated the law. The United States Supreme Court
40. 437 F.2d 312 (4th Cir. 1971).
41. 260 S.C. 30, 194 S.E.2d 181 (1973).
42. A review of the trial transcript suggests that the court could reasonably have
found otherwise. In the early morning hours of September 29, 1971, a motel clerk phoned
the Sumter police to announce that he had been robbed by two Negro men, one wearing
a white shirt and the other dressed in dark clothes. He had not seen a car. Shortly
thereafter a search was launched for the suspects, described by police dispatch as two
Negro men, one tall and one short, both wearing dark clothes. Assuming that the offenders
might be trying to escape the area by car, a deputy sheriff cruised the highway towards
Columbia, eventually overtaking an automobile which was apparently occupied by two
men. He continued to follow the car on a "hunch". Record at 41. His testimony, however,
does not indicate that he thought the occupants were trying to elude him. Police officers
in Columbia, having overheard transmissions between the deputy and his dispatcher,
formed a roadblock in the path of the appellants' car. The automobile was stopped and
approached by some twenty officers with weapons drawn. According to the testimony of
a SLED agent present at the scene, the appellants were under physical arrest at that
moment. The evidence introduced at trial was discovered shortly thereafter.
43. 260 S.C. at 37, 194 S.E.2d at 184.
44. 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
[Vol. 26
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found that, "when the officers interrupted the two men and re-
stricted their liberty of movement, the arrest, for purposes of this
case, was complete."4 In Jackson, the defendants were halted at
a roadblock and surrounded by officers with weapons drawn
before discovery of the evidence. Moreover, as conceded by the
solicitor at the trial, "when you put a pistol on somebody, you've
got him under arrest."46
Although the South Carolina Supreme Court apparently dis-
agrees with the view of arrest taken by both the United States
Supreme Court in Henry and the solicitor in Jackson, its own
attitude is difficult to ascertain. Perhaps future decisions will
clarify the court's holding in Jackson and provide predictability
in determining the occurrence of arrests and the legality of
searches and seizures which may be incident to them.47
IV. CONFESSIONS AND STATEMENTS OF THE ACCUSED
In State v. Tabory,48 the defendant contended that Miranda"
warnings should have been given prior to questioning during
which a co-defendant made an inculpatory statement. A deputy
had made a routine investigatory stop of an obviously loaded
rental truck; upon asking what was being carried, he was told
that it was empty. The court found that the statement was made
in response to "routine questions" in the course of an "on-the-
street encounter."5 No custodial interrogation had occurred, and
thus prior Miranda warnings were not required.51
The defendant in State v. Johnson 2 asserted that he had not
been informed of his Miranda rights prior to making a confession
that was later admitted into evidence. Although testimony estab-
lished that the defendant may have been under the influence of
45. Id. at 103.
46. Record at 87.
47. Had the court determined that an arrest occurred prior to the discovery of the
incriminating evidence, a novel question of law would have been presented. If an arrest is
made without probable cause under circumstances that would otherwise justify an investi-
gatory stop (see State v. Tabory, supra) is evidence subsequently discovered in plain view
admissible at trial?
48. 260 S.C. 355, 196 S.E.2d 111 (1973).
49. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
50. 260 S.C. at 356, 196 S.E.2d at 114.
51. For a comprehensive discussion of the custodial interrogation issue in Miranda
cases, see Smith, The Threshold Question in Applying Miranda: What Constitutes Cus-
todial Interrogation?, 25 S.C.L. REv. 699 (1973).
52. 260 S.C. 600, 197 S.E.2d 823 (1973).
1974]
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morphinera at the time of the questioning, the interrogating offi-
cer recalled that he "was very calm and very collected and he
talked very intelligently.' '"5 The defendant stated that he could
read and was handed a printed card containing the Miranda
warnings; he examined it and indicated that he understood the
contents. An admission of guilt followed shortly thereafter.
The court held these facts presented by the state to be suffi-
cient to raise a presumption that the appellant knowingly and
intelligently waived his Miranda rights. The burden was thus
shifted to the appellant to present facts tending to show that he
had not read or understood the warnings. 5 The defendant did not
offer testimony on the issue, and the lower court's finding of an
understanding waiver was upheld.
In State v. Cannon,"5 the defendant contended that the ini-
tial Miranda warnings were incomplete because they did not in-
clude the following information: "If you decide to answer any
questions now without a lawyer present, you will still have the
right to stop answering at any time or until you talk to a law-
yer." The court held that Miranda did not require this addi-
tional warning.58
The defendant also argued that, even if the warnings were
deemed sufficient, he had not voluntarily and knowingly waived
his rights. The defendant alleged that his confession was tainted
because the State had used undue pressure and subterfuge during
his interrogation. The eighteen year old defendant had undergone
a polygraph examination and had been confronted by five police
officers during an hour of interrogation prior to his confession.
53. Testimony received at trial indicated that the defendant was addicted to opiates
and suffering from the effects of withdrawal. Record at 63. He was apparently given
morphine prior to being transferred to the State Hospital. Record at 59. The confession
was made during that trip.
54. 260 S.C. at 602, 197 S.E.2d at 824.
55. For this proposition the court cites Bell v. United States, 382 F.2d 985 (9th Cir.
1967) and United States v. Springer, 460 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir. 1972). Bell does support the
conclusion reached. In Springer, however, the court emphasized that warnings were given
verbally to the defendant before he read them himself. Note that the waiver issue dealt
with in Johnson should be distinguished from the question of voluntariness of the confes-
sion. In this jurisdiction a higher quantum of proof may be required to establish that
inculpatory statements were voluntarily made. See Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786, 793
(4th Cir. 1970); 25 S.C.L. REV. at 387 (1973).
56. 260 S.C. at 537, 197 S.E.2d at 680 (1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 5334 (U.S.
Nov. 20, 1973).
57. 260 S.C. at 543, 197 S.E.2d at 680.
58. The court cited with special approval the reasoning of Flannigan v. State, 289
Ala. 177, 266 So. 2d 643 (1972).
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In finding the confession voluntary, the court relied heavily
on an evidentiary hearing held by the trial judge out of the pre-
sence of the jury in which both the defendant and the State were
permitted to testify to the circumstances surrounding the confes-
sion. There, the trial judge ruled that the defendant knowingly
and willingly waived his. rights under the fifth and sixth amend-
ments. Furthermore, the judge charged the jury that it could still
disregard the confession unless it was convinced beyond a reason-
able doubt that the State had proved the confession to be freely
and voluntarily made. 9 The supreme court stated that this exam-
ination by the trial judge had sufficiently explored the totality of
the circumstances surrounding defendant's confession and there-
fore held that he did not err in admitting the confession into
evidence for consideration by the jury."
V. PRE-TRIAL IDENTIFICATION
In State v. McLeod,6' the victim of an attempted rape had
recognized her assailant as the son of a neighbor. After his arrest,
the defendant was taken to the victims' home and positively iden-
tified. The appellant argued that the home confrontation was
unfair and untrustworthy and additionally contended that he had
a right to have counsel present when the identification was made.
The court ruled that the procedural and constitutional safeguards
established in United States v. Wade, 2 Gilbert v. California3 and
Stovall v. Denno4 are inapplicable where the victim knows the
accused, insofar as the danger of mistaken identity is not pres-
ent."' In rejecting the defendant's second contention the court
59. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
60. 260 S.C. at 546, 197 S.E.2d at 682.
61. 260 S.C. 445, 196 S.E.2d 645 (1973).
62. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
63. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
64. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
65. Wade and Gilbert dealt with the defendant's sixth and fourteenth amendment
rights to counsel during pretrial identification procedures. The holding in Kirby v. Illinois,
406 U.S. 682 (1972) is dispositive of this issue since adversary proceedings had not been
initiated against the defendant. In Stovall, however, the defendant argued that his con-
frontation with a stabbing victim was so suggestive and conductive to irreparable mis-
taken identification that he was denied due process of law. The court found that the
confrontation was permissible in view of the totality of the circumstances surrounding it.
In McLeod, the victim had recognized her assailant prior to the confrontation and the
dangers of misidentification were minimal. Therefore, "under the facts of this case," the
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cited Kirby v. Illinois,6 which held that the defendant's right to
counsel does not attach until adversary judicial proceedings have
been initiated.
The defendant in State v. Owens 7 contended that an in-
court identification was tainted by an unlawful confrontation in
a hallway outside the courtroom. In denying relief, the court
found that the meeting occurred purely by chance and was not
improperly suggestive of an identification. Because the witness
had previously identified the appellant from photographs and at
a preliminary hearing on a connected charge, the court concluded




The defendant in Lambert v. State69 had been sentenced to
sixteen years imprisonment after the State had recommended a
fifteen year sentence. In an appeal from denial of post-conviction
relief, the defendant contended that his guilty plea was ineffec-
tive due to a broken plea bargain. While the defendant claimed
that he had been assured that a fifteen-year sentence would be
imposed, the State successfully argued that a promise was made
only to recommend such a sentence. The requirements of
Santobello v. New York"s were thus met, and "the voluntariness
of the plea was not affected when the court did not accept the
solicitor's recommendation."
7 '
In the same appeal, the defendant asserted that the trial
court committed reversible error in failing to ascertain the volun-
tariness of the plea before accepting it. In Boykin v. Alabama,
'7 2
the United States Supreme Court noted that important constitu-
tional rights are waived when a plea of guilty is entered in a
66. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
67. 260 S.C. 79, 194 S.E.2d 246 (1973).
68. The court does not appear to consider carefully the implications of the Wade and
Gilbert decisions. See note 64 supra. It is at least arguable that there was potential for
prejudice in the confrontation that could not be reconstructed at trial and which might
have been averted had counsel been present. See 388 U.S. at 236-37.
69. 260 S.C. 617, 198 S.E.2d 118 (1973).
70. 404 U.S. 257 (1971). In Santobello it was held that: "[W]hen a plea rests in any
significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to
be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled." Id. at 262.
71. 260 S.C. at 621, 198 S.E.2d at 119-20.
72. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
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criminal trial.73 It was held in that case that a trial judge erred
in accepting a guilty plea without an affirmative showing that it
was intelligent and voluntary. Reviewing courts could not pre-
sume a waiver of such critical rights from a silent record. 4 In
Lambert, however, it was determined at the post-conviction hear-
ing that the defendant had been adequately represented by coun-
sel and that he had been fully informed as to the rights and
consequences at stake in a plea of guilty. Under Vickery v.
State,5 the failure of a trial judge to comply with the require-
ments of Boykin may be harmless error if it is demonstrated in a
later proceeding that the plea was voluntarily, intelligently and
understandingly made. In Vickery, a post-conviction hearing
began five months after the guilty plea was entered, establishing
a factual record which could be adequately reviewed by the
higher court. Thus, the court in Lambert concluded under similar
circumstances that the defendant's plea was voluntarily and in-
telligently entered.
76
B. Effectiveness of Counsel
In State v. Cutter," the defendants founded their appeal in
part on the alleged ineffectiveness of trial counsel. The state's
evidence included crucial testimony of a switchboard operator as
to a conversation overheard between a co-defendant and his al-
leged victim. The interception of this conversation appeared to be
a violation of the federal anti-wiretap law;78 if so, testimony con-
cerning statements overheard should have been suppressed. 79 Al-
though defense counsel made no motion to suppress, the supreme
court nevertheless found that the appellants had been effectively
represented, commenting that, "[I]f the conduct of the operator
under these circumstances was indeed in violation of federal law,
we question that there are many members of the trial bar or
73. The federal rights involved are the privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination, the right to trial by jury and the right to confront one's accusers. Id. at 243.
74. Id.
75. 258 S.C. 33, 186 S.E.2d 827 (1972).
76. Under Vickery, the voluntariness of a guilty plea is determined from "both the
record made at the time of the entry of the guilty plea and the record of the post-conviction
proceeding." 260 S.C. at 621, 198 S.E.2d at 119.
77. 261 S.C. 140, 199 S.E.2d 61 (1973).
78. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1968).
79. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1968). Section 2518(10)(a) provides that an aggrieved person
in any trial may move to suppress the contents of any intercepted communication on the
grounds that the interception was unlawful.
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bench of this state to whom the point would have occurred."8'
Under section 2515 of the federal anti-wiretap law, no part
of the contents of a wire or oral communication intercepted in
violation of the chapter may be received in evidence before any
court.8 ' While it is unlawful to intercept wire or oral communica-
tions, an exception is provided for the switchboard operator who
intercepts a communication ". . . while engaged in any activity
which is a necessary incident to the rendition of his service
... "I2 The operator's "activity" in Cutter, however well-
intentioned, would not fall within this exception.
Since the enactment of the federal anti-wiretap law in 1968,
section 2515 alone has been cited in over fifty federal cases., It is
obvious that the court and counsel in the Cutter trial erred by
failing to question the admissibility of the operator's testimony.
There is a significant possibility that this error was seriously pre-
judicial to the defendants' case. One wonders whether the defen-
dants find solace in the belief that there are a few members of the
bar or bench to whom the point would have occurred.
The indigent defendant in State v. Marshall8 contested a
murder conviction, asserting that he had been represented at his
arraignment by an attorney having less than five years of experi-
ence and thus was deprived of statutory rights.85 Under section
17-507 of the South Carolina Code, indigents accused of capital
offenses are to be assigned two counsel, of whom one must have
a minimum of five years of experience before the bar. Of the three
attorneys " appointed to represent the defendant, two met the
minimum qualification. Although only the attorney with less
than five years experience was present at the arraignment, no
ensuing prejudice to the appellant was shown to exist. Thus, the
defendant was not deprived of any rights under section 17-507.2'
80. 261 S.C. at 146, 199 S.E.2d at 64.
81. 18 U.S.C. § 2515.
82, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a).
83. 73 SHEPARD'S UNITED STATES CITATIONS, STATUTES AND COURT RULES No. 1, part 2
at 178 (Jan. 1974).
84. 260 S.C. 323, 195 S.E.2d 709 (1973).
85. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-507 (1962).
86. Appointment of three attorneys, however, is not illegal or prejudicial through any
inference of the seriousness of the offense charged. State v. Cooper, 212 S.C. 61, 46 S.E.2d
545 (1948).
87. Section 17-507 does not require that the more experienced counsel in fact be
present during all proceedings, although the court did not address this point.
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C. Comments from the Bench
In State v. Cutters the appellants challenged a conviction for
blackmail, asserting in part that a prejudicial question had been
posed by the court to a witness. A switchboard operator had
testified as to a conversation she overheard between a co-
defendant and his victim. At the conclusion of her testimony the
court asked, "Did he ask him for any money?" and received an
affirmative reply. 89 Citing the controlling case of State V.
Anderson,'" the supreme court found no error on the part of the
trial judge. Anderson allows the trial judge, governed by rules of
fairness and impartiality, to ask any questions he deems neces-
sary to ascertain the truth 9f matters at issue.'
The "fairness and impartiality" standard of Anderson was
stretched at least to its outer limits in State v. Mitchell, 2 where
the trial was marred by a heated verbal exchange between the
judge and defense counsel.13 The defendant sought a new trial on
the grounds that the statements of the judge and his questioning
of a witness were prejudicial. The supreme court, with Justices
Brailsford and Bussey dissenting, held that the statements of the
judge to defense counsel did not prejudice the defendant or make
it difficult for him to receive a fair trial.
The dissenting justices took a far different view, urging that
the trial judge had exceeded the bounds of propriety when he:
[Wlithout provocation disclosed by the record, lost his temper,
and, by the clearest inference if not directly, accused counsel of
misrepresenting facts to the court. The judge's examination of
the witness immediately afterward concerning the same facts
tended to emphasize his distrust of the representations which
88. 261 S.C. 140, 199 S.E.2d 61 (1973).
89. 261 S.C. at 145, 199 S.E.2d at 64.
90. 85 S.C. 299, 67 S.E. 237 (1910).
91. In Anderson it is observed that:
A grave responsibility rests upon a trial judge. It is his duty to see to it that
justice be done in every case, if it can be done according to law; and, if he thinks
that the attorney for either party, either from inadvertence or any other cause,
has failed to ask the witnesses the questions necessary and proper to bring out
all the testimony which tends to ascertain the truth of the matter under investi-
gation, we can see no legal objection to his propounding such questions; but, of
course, he should do so in a fair and impartial manner, and should not by the
form or manner of his questions express or indicate to the jury his opinion as to
the facts of the case, or as to the weight or sufficiency of the evidence. Id. at
233, 67 S.E. at 238.
92. 200 S.E.2d 448 (S.C. 1973).
93. Id. at 451-52.
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had just been made to him in the most unequivocal terms by
counsel.
The remarks of the court tended to impugn the credibility
of counsel and to diminish him and his defense of appellant in
the eyes of the jury. Counsel's ability to furnish effective repre-
sentation was to that extent impaired, perhaps to appellant's
serious prejudice."
In Smith v. State,5 the trial judge made the statement that
the defendant's husband was a "cold-blooded murderer" at the
time of sentencing. The defendant alleged that this remark evi-
denced prejudice on the part of the judge which was reflected in
the sentence given to the defendant. The supreme court per cur-
iam held that the record was devoid of prejudice because the
"consecutive sentences of three years each were well within statu-
tory and constitutional grounds and there is no showing that they
resulted to any degree from prejudice on the part of the court."9
D. Jury Charges
In State v. Taylor,7 the supreme court reversed the defen-
dant's manslaughter conviction on the grounds that failure of the
trial court to give a self-defense instruction constituted prejudi-
cial error.
The entire defense was a denial of the killing; thus no at-
tempt was made to justify it on the ground of self-defense, nor
was a charge on that ground requested. During its deliberations
the jury requested information regarding self-defense. The de-
fense counsel then requested a charge on the law of self-defense,
but the trial judge refused both requests because in his opinion
the issue had not been raised by the evidence. The supreme court
found that it was reasonably inferrable from the testimony that
the victim had been killed in self-defense, and held that failure
to charge the jury on the law of self-defense constituted reversible
error. Taylor actually reaffirms old precedent on a point not re-
cently addressed by the supreme court. Of the cases cited as
authority by the court,98 however, only State v. Pittman" makes
94. Id. at 452-53. Mitchell was found guilty despite uncontradicted testimony of a
state psychiatrist that he had been legally insane at the time of the alleged crime.
95. 199 S.E.2d 302 (S.C. 1973).
96. Id. at 303.
97. 200 S.E. 2d 387 (S.C. 1973).
98. Id. at 388.
99. 137 S.C. 75, 134 S.E. 514 (1926).
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it clear that a self-defense charge is not required in all homicide
cases."" There, as in Taylor, the court required such a charge only
where it was reasonably inferrable from the evidence that "the
accused inflicted the mortal wound but justifiably did so in self-
defense."'"'
In State v. Graham, °2 the defendant had answered murder
charges with a plea of self-defense. The charge to the jury in-
cluded instructions concerning the laws of mutual combat and
the jury was informed "that the plea of self-defense could not be
invoked if the shooting resulted from mutual intent to fight.'
'0 3
Appellant was convicted of manslaughter and his exceptions to
the jury charge were rejected. Evidence that the parties had
armed themselves and threatened each other was held to warrant
submission of the issue of mutual combat to the jury. '"4
E. Sentencing
In the companion cases of Richards v. Crump'W5 and Fields
v. Leeke,'05 indigent defendants were convicted and alternatively
sentenced to pay immediate fines or serve a period of imprison-
ment. Incarcerated because of their inability to pay, the defen-
dants appealed, alleging that they had been unconstitutionally
deprived of due process and equal protection of the law. The court
found it unnecessary to deal with the constitutional issues, rely-
ing instead on legislation recently enacted by the General Assem-
bly,' 07 but not in force when the defendants were tried and sent-
100. See also State v. Anderson, 85 S.C. 229, 67 S.E. 237 (1910).
101. 200 S.E.2d at 388.
102. 260 S.C. 449, 196 S.E.2d 495 (1973).
103. Id. at 450, 196 S.E.2d at 495.
104. In general, a defendant may not claim self-defense if he could, with reasonable
safety, have retreated from the combat. State v. Jackson, 227 S.C. 271, 87 S.E.2d 681
(1955). The plea of self-defense is likewise unavailable to the defendant who meets another
with the intention of doing injury to him. State v. Jones, 113 S.C. 134, 101 S.E. 647 (1919).
Mutuality of intent will not justify a claim of self-defense.
105. 260 S.C. 504, 197 S.E. 2d 298 (1973).
106. 260 S.C. 507, 197 S.E.2d 299 (1973).
107. No. 233, [1973] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 266. Section 1 of the Act provides that:
In any offense carrying a fine or imprisonment, the judge or magistrate hearing
the case shall, upon a decision of guilty of the accused being determined and it
being established that he is indigent at that time, set up a reasonable payment
schedule for the payment of such fine, taking into consideration the income,
dependents, and necessities of life of the individual. Such payments shall be
made to the magistrate or clerk of court as the case may be until such fine is
paid in full. Failure to comply with the payment schedule shall constitute con-
tempt of court; however, imprisonment for contempt may not exceed the
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enced. This statute directs the sentencing judge, upon the convic-
tion of an indigent for an offense carrying a fine or imprisonment,
to set up a reasonable schedule for the payment of the fine. The
cases were accordingly remanded for resentencing.'5 5
It is probable that the same result would be required under
the constitutional claims raised by the defendants. In Williams
v. Illinois,"°9 it was held that "a State may not constitutionally
imprison beyond the maximum duration fixed by statute a defen-
dant who is financially unable to pay a fine."110 A concurring
opinion in Morris v. Schoonfield"I considered other sentencing
practices to be equally violative of the Equal Protection Clause:
"[T]he same constitutional defect condemned in Williams also
inheres in jailing an indigent for failing to make immediate pay-
ment of any fine, whether or not the fine is accompanied by a jail
term .... 112
This position was adopted by the majority of the Court in
Tate v. Short."' On the basis of these precedents, the Fifth Cir-
cuit in Frazier v. Jordan"4 condemned the sentencing practices
that were challenged in Richards and Fields. It was held that the
alternative sentence resulted in a difference of treatment based
on wealth, creating a suspect classification which could only be
justified by a compelling state interest. The court rejected the
argument that punitive and deterrent interests could not be ade-
quately protected through alternative methods of fine collec-
tion." 11
amount of time of the original sentence, and where part of the fine has been paid
the imprisonment cannot exceed the remaining pro rata portion of the sentence.
No person found to be indigent shall be imprisoned because of inability to
pay the fine in full at the time of conviction.
Entitlement to free counsel shall not be determinative as to defendant's
indigency.
108. Although the defendants were convicted and sentenced before enactment of the
statute, the court does not question its applicability to their case. It is merely stated that
resentencing is required "in keeping with the provisions of this legislative enactment." 260
S.C. at 506, 197 S.E.2d at 299.
109. 399 U.S. 235 (1970). The indigent defendant had been sentenced both to pay a
fine and serve the maximum period of imprisonment provided by law. After completing
the prison sentence he was incarcerated for an additional period to "work off" his mone-
tary obligations.
110. Id. at 243.
111. 399 U.S. 508 (1969).
112. Id. at 509.
113. 401 U.S. 395 (1971). In Tate, an indigent was jailed due to his inability to pay
traffic fines. Under the state laws applicable at that time, fines were the only punishment
authorized for the offenses committed.
114. 457 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1972).
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It is ironic that the South Carolina statute enacted to deal
with these objections may itself be challenged as violative of the
Equal Protection clause. The court in Frazier notes that: "[I]t
would likely be impermissible for the state to collect over time
from indigents an amount whose present value would be less than
that of the fine imposed on non-indigents."
6
Thus, Frazier suggests that courts must employ in such cases
either interest payments or something in the nature of the time
price differential found in installment sales contracts. By not
doing so the South Carolina law seems to provide for the imposi-




In State v. Owens,"7 the defendant contended that he had
been denied a speedy trial because of a delay of approximately
six months. In upholding the trial court's refusal to dismiss, the
supreme court noted that the defendant "failed to meet the bur-
den of showing that delay in his trial was 'due to the neglect and
wilfulness of the State's prosecution.' "111s
The speedy trial issue is dealt with more comprehensively in
State v. Foster."9 The defendants had been indicted for house-
breaking .in 1965; while on bond they were apprehended and in-
carcerated in Florida for other crimes. Although a detainer was
placed with the imprisoning authorities, no additional action was
taken until the defendants demanded a speedy trial in 1971. An
additional one and one-half year delay ensued before the defen-
dants were returned to South Carolina to stand trial.
In finding that the defendants had not been denied their
sixth amendment rights, the supreme court relied on the balanc-
ing test formulated in Barker v. Wingo. 20 That case identifies
four factors to be assessed in determining whether the right to a
speedy trial has been abridged: "Length of delay, the reason for
the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right and prejudice to
116. Id. (citations omitted).
117. 260 S.C. 79, 194 S.E.2d 246 (1973).
118. Id. at 82, 194 S.E.2d at 248; see State v. Dukes, 245 S.C. 218, 242, 182 S.E.2d
286, 288 (1971).
119. 260 S.C. 511, 197 S.E.2d 280 (1973).
120. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
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the defendant."'' In Foster, the court acknowledges that the
delay involved was rather lengthy but attributes it to the State's
"inaction" and "administrative procedures" rather than to any
"active attempt . . . to delay the trials."'22 The court further
notes that "[tihe record offers no reason for the failure of the
defendants to assert their right sooner, and under Barker a failure
to assert the right will make it difficult for the defendants to
prove that they were denied a speedy trial."'1'
Finally, the State demonstrated the lack of any prejudice
resulting from the seven and one-half year delay. While the prose-
cution presented four witnesses including the arresting officers,
the defendants chose not to offer any testimony in their defense.
In upholding the conviction, the court concluded that this lack
of prejudice, coupled with the defendants' tardiness in requesting
trial, outweighs the State's responsibility for the delay. The de-
fendants' right to a speedy trial had not been abridged.
It should be noted that the defendant in Barker was repre-
sented by counsel throughout. The Court there emphasized that,
for strategic reasons, the defendant made no objection to the
numerous continuances sought by the prosecutor.' In Foster, it
appears that the defendants were not represented by counsel dur-
ing their imprisonment in Florida and might thus have been una-
ware of their rights to demand a speedy trial. This issue, however,
was not raised on appeal.
The court does not clearly address itself to the defendants'
contention that prejudice resulted from the death of two wit-
nesses and the unavailability of another.' 5 In Foster, the court
apparently relied heavily on the relative weakness of the defen-
dants' case in finding that "the record is simply void of even
minimal prejudice."'2 6 It is certainly conceivable, however, that
the defense was inadequate not in spite of, but rather as a result
of, the seven and one-half year delay.
B. Conferring with Sequestered Witnesses
During the course of the trial in State v. Taylor, 21 the court
121. Id. at 530.
122. 260 S.C. at 514-15, 197 S.E.2d at 281.
123. Id.
124. 407 U.S. at 534-35.
125. Brief for Appellant at 8, State v. Foster, 260 S.C. 511, 197 S.E.2d 280 (1973).
126. 260 S.C. at 515, 197 S.E.2d at 282.
127. 200 S.E.2d 387 (S.C. 1973).
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ruled that the defendant could not personally confer with his own
sequestered witnesses. Although the court refused to determine
whether the ruling constituted prejudicial error,' 28 it decided to
"make the following observations which may be of some help and
guidance to the court should the issue reoccur upon the retrial of
the case.' 1 29 The court recognized that the accused has a constitu-
tional right to be present at every stage of a criminal trial, is
entitled to be represented by counsel and to assist counsel in the
preparation of his defense. Thus, the court concluded, without
citing any authority, that any rule abridging the right of a defen-
dant to confer with his witnesses before presenting them must "be
examined with close scrutiny."'3 Such scrutiny should not, how-
ever, preclude reasonable precautions by the court to insure that
the purpose of sequestration' is not defeated. In this regard, the
court noted, "requiring the presence of defense counsel, who is
himself an officer of the court, should be adequate protection.' 32
C. Adequacy of Proof
In State v. Tabory,133 the defendant unsuccessfully con-
tended that inadequate proof existed to sustain a conviction for
possession of marijuana. Possession cannot be established absent
a showing that the defendant had a right to exercise dominion
and control over the thing allegedly possessed. 34 The court found
that proof of the defendant's presence in a truck carrying the
contraband, coupled with the incrimimating testimony of a
State's witness, made a jury issue on the question of possession.
In State v. Owens 35 the defendant argued that a directed
verdict should have been granted by the trial court due to the
State's failure to prove facts alleged in the indictments. Whereas
the defendant was charged with making and uttering a forged
instrument, no evidence was produced to show that he had made
the forgery. The supreme court rejected this contention, citing
State v. Orr."6 In that case it is said: "[Olne found in the posses-
sion of a forged instrument . . . and applying it to his own use,
128. There was a question as to whether the ruling was appropriately objected to.
129. 200 S.E.2d at 389.
130. Id.
131. See generally 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1837-38.
132. 200 S.E.2d at 389.
133. 260 S.C. 355, 196 S.E.2d 111 (1973).
134. See, e.g., United States v. Bethea, 422 F.2d 790 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
135. 260 S.C. 79, 194 S.E.2d 246 (1973).
136. 225 S.C. 369, 82 S.E.2d 523 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 848 (1954).
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must, in the absence of explanation satisfactory to the jury, be
presumed to have forged it or to have been privy to its forgery.'
' 37
D. Delay in Driver's License Suspension
In State v. Chavis,3 the State appealed an order reinstating
'the driver's license of the respondent. Respondent Chavis had
been convicted of driving under the influence of intoxicating li-
quor' 31 and had previously refused to submit to a breathalyzer
test. The South Carolina Highway Department was not notified
of this refusal or of the conviction until approximately one year
later. Respondent's license was then suspended for consecutive
periods of 90 days'40 and 6 months.' 4 ' The trial court found that
the delayed suspensions were violative of due process. The su-
preme court rejected this reasoning and overturned the reinstate-
ment order. The court noted that the Highway Department had
not been notified of the infractions and thus was not responsible
for the delay; in addition, the respondent failed to demonstrate
any resulting prejudice. The Department merely executed man-
datory duties in ordering the suspensions and the statutory provi-
sions themselves were sufficient notice to the respondent.
E. Post-conviction Relief
In Guinyard v. State,' the defendant appealed the lower
court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, 3 contend-
ing that relief should have been granted due to the State's failure
to respond to his application within thirty days as prescribed by
section 17-606111 of the Code. Noting that this section "grants to
the trial court authority to extend the time for the filing of any
137, Id. at 374, 82 S.E.2d at 526.
138. 200 S.E.2d 390 (S.C. 1973).
139, S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-343 (1962).
140, S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-344(d). The penalty for refusal to submit to the breathaly-
zer test is a ninety-day suspension of the driver's license (Cum. Supp. 1973).
141, S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-348 (1962). The licenses of first offenders under § 46-
348 are suspended for six months.
142. 260 S.C. 220, 195 S.E.2d 392 (1973).
143. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-601 et seq. (1962).
144. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-601(a) (1962) reads as follows:
Within thirty days after the docketing of the application, or within any
further time the court may fix, the State shall respond by answer or by motion
which may be supported by affidavits. At any time prior to entry of judgment
the court may, when appropriate, issue orders for amendment of the application
or any pleading or motion, for pleading over, for filing further pleadings or
[Vol. 26
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pleading,"' 45 the supreme court reasoned that the time limit is
discretionary with the trial court rather than mandatory. The six
month delay accordingly was found to be permissible. The court
suggests that this holding is not conclusive; since the issue appar-
ently was not raised before the trial court, the objection could not
be made for the first time on appeal.
It might be observed that the record is silent as to other
significant matters. Under section 17-601(a) the trial-court may
"issue orders . .. for extending the time of the filing of any
pleading.""'4 The record fails to disclose that the trial court issued
such an order at any time during the six month delay between the
application for relief and the State's response. Perhaps we are to
infer from Guinyard that the lower court would have issued such
an order had the State bothered to request it.
In State v. Adams'47 it was held that, although a witness'
testimony at the preliminary hearing as to the date of an illegal
transaction differed from the date testified to at trial, no surprise
or prejudice to the defendant resulted. The correct date had pre-
viously been identified in the warrant and indictment; the defen-




motions, or for extending the time of the filing of any pleading. In considering
the application, the court shall take account of substance, regardless of defects
of form. If the application is not accompanied by the record of the proceedings
challenged therein, the respondent shall file with its answer the record or por-
tions thereof that are material to the questions raised in the application.
145. 260 S.C. at 225, 195 S.E.2d at 394.
146. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-601(a) (1962).
147. 201 S.E.2d 129 (S.C. 1973).
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